Chapter Five

Husserl, Expressionism, and the Eidetic Impulse in *Brücke's* Woodcut

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With very few exceptions, phenomenologists have not been very interested in reconstructing some of the leading ideas in the phenomenological tradition with respect to their origin in the culture within which they emerged.[1] This lack of interest is even more surprising if we take into account that central concepts that phenomenologists have elucidated, such as empathy (*Einfühlung*), first emerged in psychology and art history at the beginning of the twentieth century. My essay attempts to shed some light onto these interconnections between culture and phenomenology, and seeks to demonstrate how one of the most prominent ideas in phenomenology, namely, Husserl's concept of eidetic variation and the "intuition of essences" are "echoed" by an aesthetic culture in Germany during the first decades of the twentieth century. Adorno once remarked that avant-garde movements such as Expressionism referred to Husserl,[2] and although this claim was advanced without any concrete reference, his observation is, as we will see, correct.

In its most progressive forms, the first quarter of the twentieth century (in Germany) was deeply characterized by the Expressionist art movements. German Expressionism is especially important since it was not only a movement that determined the fine arts, but it was also important for the literary arts (poetry and literature), the performative arts (film and theater), as well as architecture. In Germany's extensive public museum culture, one learns, even today, that expressionist fine art is *the* modern German art and, indeed, many museums focus on German expressionism.

In what follows, I will focus on painting and the graphic arts, and demonstrate that Husserl's eidetic variation and eidetic intuition can be understood from an aesthetic point of view and that they can be used to better understand

the German Expressionist modernism both in graphic arts and in woodcuts. The overall intuition behind my essay is fairly simple: the attempt by German Expressionist artists to reveal the essence of the world in their art (particularly, artists of the *Brücke* movement) should be seen as exercising an eidetic intuition that gives the viewer direct access to the truth of that which is depicted. Expressionist art, at least the movement that I have in mind, does not "apply" phenomenology; rather, at its core, it *is* phenomenological. The desire to show the essence of the world, accordingly, turns expressionist works into what might be called "eidetic works." In a similar fashion, art historians such as Reisenfeld speak of "Brücke's ideological search for essence."[3] The truth of the world reveals itself in paintings, drawings, and woodcuts by focusing on and revealing the essence of scenes, moods, and geographical settings. These works of art thereby not only reveal certain features of German regional landscapes, such as the north (water, flatness, horizon, wind) and the south (mountains, hills, sun, light), but also attempt to reveal modern life as it could be found in towns such as Berlin, Dresden, and Cologne during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Accordingly, we should understand the expressionist woodcut as an essentialist take on the world that can achieve more than a drawing, insofar as its relief printing allows a combination of primacy of the line with the primacy of outline in a material that is mainly spatial, and the material reveals a world that is "woody."[4] To some extent one could argue that, because of its reductive nature and its materiality, which requires a direct handling by the artist, the woodcut is a good source for understanding the most basic formal intuitions of artists. As Ernst-Ludwig Kirchner has it, "there is no better place to get to know an artist than in his graphic work."[5]

As many interpreters have noted, the social and cultural ideals of the *Brücke* artists were posited against mass society and industrialized production. This position has primarily been interpreted as involving a "romanticist" worldview that is based on subjective rejections of modernity instead on an attempt to express a truly progressive character. For example, commentators note that "the adaption by Brücke artists of a pre-industrialist communal structure, in which they acted as their own printer, publisher and retailer"[6] was in its core antimodernist. However, these commentators fail to see that this ideal is based on the projection of a more "cooperative, more productive society of equals"[7] and a democratic vision of the *future* instead of a romanticized past. This vision is primarily visible in the *group* and *social* definition of the modern artist, most prominently developed by the *Brücke* movement. For example, nonbourgeois ideals of nudity and a nonviolent relation to nature, as well as progressive views that were held in regard to gender relations and war speak against the claim that expressionist art movements tried to restore a premodern and precapitalist world. Moreover, expressionist movements such as the *Brücke* are based on the rejection of artists as modern

agents who need "to accumulate and manage material wealth,"[8] which is an ideal that these movements tried to realize in artist colonies, such as Worpswede, that were very popular before the First World War. Accordingly, we should note that at least in part expressionist art implies progressive visions of a different future, despite Lukacs's complaint that these positions remained nonrevolutionary, are not class-based, and only "abstractly" negate the bourgeois opposition.[9] As a consequence, though I admire Lukacs's firm political position, I feel closer to Bloch's and Adorno's critiques of Lukacs's harsh "party line." I will briefly come back to the famous "expressionism debate" at the end of this essay.[10]

Similarly, most contemporary phenomenologists overlook the deep *social* commitments that phenomenologists at the beginning of the twentieth century projected into the *way in which they philosophized together*. We should not forget that phenomenology was based on the idea that it can be organized as a *school* of scholars, which carries forward a vision of philosophy that cannot be reduced to the individual, specialized, and atomized philosopher alone, but, instead, can only be *successfully* carried out in a group. Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a *collective* endeavor. In addition, Husserl was convinced that *every* philosopher could become a phenomenologist, which is deeply democratic and implies a rejection of phenomenology as the business of trained academic professionals. Though this might sound naïve, the point is that phenomenology as a *practice* is based on a progressive social vision and a vision of how to live an authentically philosophical life. In our times, most of us have totally forgotten that a specific theoretical position in philosophy implies a specific way regarding how philosophy is supposed to be *carried out* and how *it is supposed to be lived*. The fact that a philosopher such as Sartre could still be fascinated by the openness of phenomenology as a discipline that is able to philosophize about the cocktail glass in a bar might be a romantic idea of philosophy, but it still contains a vision of philosophy as a social and public praxis.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE ARTISTIC ATTITUDE

In his letter to Hofmannsthal, himself an expressionist artist, Husserl underlines the close proximity of the phenomenological attitude of the philosopher and the aesthetic attitude of the artist. As Husserl argues, although phenomenology and art are based on different goals, insofar as the phenomenologist tries to achieve scientific objectivity and the artist subjective authenticity, their positions toward reality and towards the experience of reality is very similar.[11] Husserl writes in this letter:

> **Phenomenological intuiting is thus closely related to the aesthetic intuiting in "pure" art; obviously it is not an intuiting that serves the purpose of aesthetic**

> **pleasure, but rather the purpose of continued investigations and cognition, and of constituting scientific insights in a new sphere (the philosophical sphere).** [12]

Though we could debate Husserl's claim that the purpose of the artist is related to aesthetic pleasure, he argues that the beginning point of the artist's and the phenomenologist's attempt to make sense of the world are very similar, insofar as both presuppose a specific distancing from reality. As Husserl points out, the phenomenological attitude presupposes a form of bracketing of everyday experience that the artist must carry out, too:

> **For many years I have attempted to get a clear sense of the basic problems of philosophy, and then of the methods for solving them, all of which led me to the "phenomenological" method as a permanent acquisition. It demands an attitude towards all forms of objectivity that fundamentally departs from its "natural" counterpart, and which is closely related to the attitude and stance in which your art, as something purely aesthetic, places us with respect to the presented objects and the whole of the surrounding world. The intuition of a purely aesthetic work of art is enacted under a strict suspension of all existential attitudes of the intellect and of all attitudes relating to emotions and the will which presuppose such an existential attitude.** [13]

Husserl's observation is truly astonishing, since he claims that both the phenomenologist and the artist carry out investigations into the nature of the world, whether done with the purpose of beauty or whether done with the purpose of truth, they each presuppose an act of "bracketing" in which all beliefs regarding the existence of the world are suspended. Put differently, both the phenomenologist and the artist are not interested in the existence of the world; instead, both are interested in its constitution. Husserl goes on and describes the artist's attitude in more detail:

> **The *artist*, who "observes" the world in order to gain "knowledge" of nature and man for his own purposes, relates to it in a similar way as the phenomenologist. Thus: not as an observing natural scientist and psychologist, not as a practical observer of man, as if it were an issue of knowledge of man and nature. When he observes the world, it becomes a phenomenon for him, its existence is indifferent, just as it is to the philosopher (in the critique of reason). The difference is that the artist, unlike the philosopher, does not attempt to found the "meaning" of the world-phenomenon and grasp it in concepts, but appropriates it intuitively, in order to gather, out if its plenitude, materials for the creation of aesthetic forms.** [14]

If we take into account that the act of bracketing the belief in the existence of the world is only the first step of a proper phenomenological investigation and that Husserl's idea of phenomenology is based on the idea that we "vary" the content of our intuition in and throughout self-reflective fantasy acts with the goal of gaining essential insight, it should become clear immediately how

he conceives of the difference between the "conceptual" grasp of the reality by the philosopher and the "intuitive" grasp of the reality by the artist. Both the artist and the philosopher perform eidetic variations, but the artist is not interested in the absolute truth of this variation in an explicitly truth oriented way; rather, the forms with which the artist operates remain subjected to beauty and its reception in aesthetic pleasure. For example, a writer might give us an essential insight into a character, a person, a virtue, or any other aspect of the world for that matter, but the variation on which the presentation of these essential aspects are ultimately based, according to Husserl, remain oriented toward aesthetic pleasure and are therefore not oriented toward absolute truth.

As I have pointed out elsewhere, the phenomenological method should be understood as an *open* and *playful* relation to what is to be found in reflection and intuition.[15] The playfulness of phenomenology, as it is visible in the eidetic intuition, accordingly, connects it to the artistic way of "playing" with world content in order to let us see essential aspects *of* it. Already at this point, it is important to note that this "playing around" with world content is an aspect that entered the art world *explicitly* in modern avant-garde movements, such as cubism, surrealism, and expressionism. As Kracauer observes, expressionist artists "reflect on that which is supposed to come out in them from all sides and turn it back and forth."[16] He notices, accordingly, a *playful* attitude toward the world that is based on a neutralization of the world as existing reality. In contradistinction to Kracauer, however, I argue here that this playfulness and "subjectivization" of the world should be seen as a *means* toward objectivity and not, as he argues, as a dissolution of the reality in the mind of the artist. Similarly, phenomenology is less strict and "rigorous" than some of its interpreters seem to think, insofar as the rigorous results of Husserl's research can only come about in an openness toward "playing around" with something in the phenomenologists mind. And this can only come about throughout a hermeneutic process of clarification and communication, which is often underestimated.

HUSSERL'S EIDETIC INTUITION[17]

Let us briefly turn to the description of eidetic intuition—the mode of consciousness that allows phenomenology to come up with its conceptual assertions—which Husserl presents in detail in the 1925 lectures on *Phenomenological Psychology* (material that was then used in *Experience and Judgment* as well). Generally speaking, this ideative method is a matter of using fantasy modifications of a matter in order to bring it to "originary givenness" (to clear evidence), just as it itself is intuitively given.

The first step of the eidetic method consists of freeing our experience from its factual status. This step is then followed by the process of variation, which already plays a role in normal experience—for example, in intuitive pre-illustration, as when, for instance, I picture to myself what the back side of the book lying in front of me looks like, or how person X will behave when I encounter them tomorrow. In such cases, my variation remains bound to the object known to me from actual experience; I know the book from actually experiencing it "in the flesh," and the person coming to see me tomorrow is someone I already know. Now in order to establish what character this person has—how this person actually is "in essence"—I do the following: I consider how this person might behave in all possible situations. In this way, I am varying the experience that I already have of this person, but in order to do this, I must consider the experiences that I have as *possibilities*. In other words, I use fantasy variation to *imagine* that the person is the way I think this person "actually" is. However, when I am considering how the person may change under these or those circumstances, or what modes of comportment or characteristics this person might display, I am varying the *past* experiences I have had of the person.

The second step of eidetic method consists in moving from real possibility to pure possibility, producing "thing-fictions and world-fictions" as pure fantasies that no longer refer back to any pregiven fact of my experience. I can now perform intuitive modifications, and for Husserl this is the way to attain genuine a priori insight. Thus in fantasy variation, that which is to be varied is not emptily intended or merely talked about, but is brought to *intuitive* givenness. In fantasy, then, the object appears to me in the mode of "as if," since the belief in and the positing of the object are neutralized. It is only in this way that the series of modifications can be subject to my free fantasizing. Yet despite the freedom of thinking up variations in sheer imagination, with its "fancying arbitrariness,"[18] at its core, the process of fantasy variation is still controlled by a limit: as a synthesis of modifications, that which I am varying in fantasy is not subject to *my* control, for in the very process of varying, I find myself controlled *by* certain essential laws. During the process of variation, "a continual coincidence . . . of the variants"[19] is preserved as the necessary "invariable" that Husserl calls the *eidos*.

Thus in phenomenological clarification, essences are not immediately given, but are instead what the investigation aims at as its *result*. Many Husserl scholars overlook this ultimately *communicative* process of clarification. For it is not only that a single phenomenologist performs eidetic variations to gain clarification about a matter; rather, it is a process through which clarification can be reached through expression and interpretation. Accordingly, the eidetic variation, at least in my mind, is in its core a hermeneutic process, because, unlike mathematics, the universal structures of consciousness do not display exact essences, and moreover, these structures can be

treated at various levels of universality. For example, we can distinguish a "regional typology"[20] as well as universal essences; even the "empirically typical" such as "duck-billed platypuses, lions, etc.,"[21] or the "mineralogical and geological typology"[22]—or, in short, anything empirical—can be investigated as to "its" a priori. Hence the delimitation of a research domain that is infinite in principle is *only* accomplished insofar as phenomenology subjects itself to a certain type or level of cognitive interest. Phenomenology, then, is not interested—for example, in the essence of duck-billed platypuses, but rather, in structures that lie in principle at a higher level. Here, one can see that the concept of possibility that Husserl outlines in the context of eidetic variation is poorly named when it is termed *essence*; his notions of "type" or of "style" are better suited.

As I have argued elsewhere against methodological reductions in Husserlian scholarship[23], the genesis of the phenomenological attitude should be seen in everyday aesthetic attitudes, such as *play*, and the hermeneutic attempt to come to an understanding as a process. This hermeneutic moment of Husserl's philosophy is based upon what he calls the "method of clarification" in *Ideas 1*. What Husserl means by the "method of clarification" is the event of intuitive explication and the intellectual *performance* within which one makes phenomenological discoveries. This is the preliminary stage of eidetic variation. Since phenomenology mainly deals with inexact essences in the sense of *types*, then the attempt to fix what is being addressed phenomenologically in *linguistic* concepts constantly remains "in flux." By virtue of the temporality of consciousness and its unexplicated horizons, *every* explication of essences *necessarily* has, and already presupposes, a further horizon that shifts the process of determining appropriate concepts into infinity *in principle*. Phenomenological findings are thus not only "ideal" unities, but can only be grasped in this way as *idealized* significations that always remain open to correction *in principle*. There is no "final word" in phenomenology because the horizon of each phenomenon is embedded in infinite horizons, and Husserl's lifetime correction of his own descriptions are evidence that Husserl himself conceived of the descriptive and expressive aspect of his writing exercises as an open process of communication and correction of what had been revealed before, which does not allow us to claim any sense-horizon as ultimate or final. After performing the epochē, the phenomenologist discovers a concrete totality of sense that must be presupposed (with respect not only to its contents, but also its empty horizons) before it can be idealized. The reflective process, and the process of finding universal conceptual contents, is therefore itself a *process of fulfillment* in which intuitive acts are fulfilled. There is no reason why we should fail to understand this process as a process through which we "play around" with possibilities, especially given that the epochē leads us into the realm of existing and even

pure possibilities to which we only have access in our imagination. Let us now come back to the relation between the artist and the phenomenologist.

The difference between the phenomenologist and the artist is twofold: (1) the artist cannot remain within her imaginative realm. Accordingly, the variation and the playing around with possibilities remains tied to the *real* process of creating images in a medium and with materials. For the artist, variation process is therefore a deeply material process in which the image has to be wrested from the material and throughout which the artist is not limited by "pure" limits of what is supposed to be presented; rather, the artistic process of ideation is limited by the materiality of the imaging process itself, since the image is material and bound to an earthly medium. (2) The process of clarification in the case of the artist is not only, as in the case of the phenomenologist, determined by propositional language and the ability of the phenomenologist to describe in *general* language the varied content of the ideation, but also determined by the materiality of the process, which goes beyond language alone and includes the history and materiality of the embodied world, the skills employed by the artist, the tools used, and the materiality selected for the work.

Consequently, we need to conclude that Husserl overlooked this point in his letter to Hofmannsthal, insofar as he only points to the different goals as a limiting factor for the scope of eidetic variation. What he does not see is that the creative process itself is the main reason for why the eidetic variations of the phenomenologist and the artist differ, which cannot be approached by language alone.[24] The fact that Husserl communicates with a writer and not, for that matter, with a fine artist, might have supported his shortsighted understanding of the artistic process. Let me now turn to the relation between Husserl's eidetic variation and expressionist art.

HUSSERL AND WORRINGER

It is less known that one of Husserl's main concepts, namely *Einfühlung*, not only goes back to Lipps introduction of the term in his psychological philosophy, but that it is was primarily made popular by the art historian Wilhelm Worringer, whose work *Abstraction and Empathy* appeared in 1907.[25] Worringer's book was enthusiastically received in expressionist artist circles around that time.[26] The details of Worringer's interesting, though highly speculative, reflections about the main human and historical impulses and motives of the creative process and its differing stylistic consequences, are of less importance for my purpose here since I think that the abstract dualism that Worringer introduces in his text between a form of art that is based on empathy and a form of art that is based on abstraction should *as a unity* be applied to the expressionist eidetic variation. In contrast to Worringer and

other interpreters of that time, I believe that the artistic eidetic process contains a synthesis of abstraction and empathy, instead of being based on one of them, as Worringer argues.

To summarize his position briefly, Worringer assumed that the impulse for abstraction, the tendency toward subjectivization, and the desire for the essential and formal, is born out of a defense mechanism of creative life. Put simply, whenever human life finds itself too overwhelmed by the external world, which can come about through civilizatiory achievements or sensual dangers, creative humans retreat into themselves, develop more intellectual projections, and come up with "abstract" expressions that help to overcome the anxiety on which these abstractions are based. The consequence of this anxiety-based impulse for abstraction and formalistic attempts to cope with the overpowering reality and its dangerous experience is the turn away from what characterizes the sensual world, namely, time and space. Abstract artists, including architects, retreat from the flow of time, the ever-changing nature of reality, as well as from the spatial dimension. It is easy to see how Worringer's contemporaries saw in his theory as the best explanation of what they saw happening in German modern art, such as expressionism. Even Lukacs, implicitly following Worringer on this point, argues that expressionist art is based on an "ideology of escape"[27] and spatial flight. The expressionist movement was from the beginning interpreted as such an escape, since especially in the fine arts there was a tendency to "flatten" out the image, to reintroduce the line as a determining moment in painting, and to turn away from French impressionism. Accordingly, it was easy to build up the myth of German art as an attempt to get to the essential and the rational versus French art as a turn toward the sensual and toward pleasure. The simple analogy ends here, however.

First of all, it should be noted that the *Brücke* artists referred explicitly in their documents and manifestos to Lipps's concept of empathy as the foundation for their creative impulse. As the art historian Maike Hoffmann notes in regard to expressionist image practices, "the instinctual refinement of form in the sensual experience [*Erlebnis*] is impulsively transported to the plane."[28] Accordingly, what we have in front of us is not simply the intellectual retreat *from* sensual reality toward something intellectual and abstract, but, instead, the abstractive process should itself be seen as a movement *toward* the sensual and the material involved in this process. It seems to me that most interpreters totally miss this fact since they tend to overintellectualize the expressionist impulse as one that tries to establish certain abstractions external to the sensual, whereas I contend that the abstraction is itself a move *toward* the sensual *with* the use of materials such as wood. I will come back to this point shortly.

As an example of this, Kracauer claims that expressionist art is against tradition and history,[29] that it is exclusively interested in the ego in its pri-

mordial structure,[30] and that expressionist art is based on an abstract idea of human "as such,"[31] which leads expressionist artists, according to Kracauer, to a romanticized and infantilized rejection of the (threatening bourgeois) world. Kracauer, and many others at the beginning of the twentieth century, conceived the expressionist movement as a strictly antirealist movement that is hostile to its own environment.[32] According to Kracauer's thesis, put forward well before Lukacs, the expressionist's creative impulse is based on the will to eradicate reality and gives any presentation of reality up.[33] Kracauer goes even so far as to claim that the expressionist experience is based upon lines and colors that no longer remind us of anything in reality.[34] From our contemporary point of view, and having in mind the radical abstraction that followed modern avant-garde movements, this view is truly surprising, but its shows just how revolutionary modernist art was conceived at the point of its historical emergence.

I contend that Kracauer's and Worringer's one-sided abstract dualisms remain too abstract. In contrast to their positions, we should see the impulse of abstraction and empathy as *one* process. This can be achieved either by taking into account Adorno's concept of artistic creation as both a destructive and mimetic act, or with the help of Husserl, for whom the eidetic variation is based on both elements, too. On the one hand, we are supposed to take something out of the experience in order to find its essence; on the other hand, we are supposed to mimetically—that is, "empathetically," describe and *express* what the issue in question is about. As I explained in the foregoing section, Husserl calls this process a *process of clarification*. Accordingly, we should also reject the idea of expressionism as the attempt to reject *any* concept of representation or imitation [*Abbildung*],[35] since the eidetic process *is* a mimetic process. We would do well to remind ourselves that the nature of eidetic variation is a process of *intuition* and not a process of arguments or logical conclusions. This intuition, accordingly, is a deeply *mimetic* relation because in intuiting we are not making logical moves. As such, it is reasonable to link intuition to empathy (broadly construed). However, *mimesis* is not simply an imitation; rather, put in Gadamerian language, *it is a process through which we gain insight into something*. Mimesis can thus be viewed as a form of recognition. Consequently, if my idea of applying the eidetic variation to the artistic process of the *Brücke* artists makes any sense, we are permitted to understand the artistic eidetic variation as a process of abstraction and variation *in* the material and, consequently, as a material process throughout which the image is mimetically and empathetically developed *out of* the material. According to Hoffmann, we should understand the *Brücke* art as "a form of painting and drawing that emerges out of intuition."[36] It is also essential to note that important expressionist painters, such as Schmidt-Rottluff and Kirchner, studied architecture at the Technical University Dresden between 1901 and 1906[37] where they were

instructed by teachers who were opposed to conceptual approaches to art and, instead, opted for the emergence of art out of the immediate experience of forms and colors.[38] Let me turn to this process in more detail.

BRÜCKE, WOOD, LANDSCAPE

Inspired by Japanese woodcuts,[39] van Gogh's late inventions, Munch's paintings, and Kandinsky's work in 1904, the *Brücke* artists worked out a totally new way of dealing with materiality, which is largely based on their unique and revolutionary approach to the graphic arts and a material that was at the beginning of the twentieth century reduced to a commercial material, namely, wood. The *Brücke* artists often used graphic arts and woodcuts in connection with printed documents for group activities and exhibitions, which helped to make this new graphic impulse more popular within a committed community *without* its former commercial context. Moreover, they liberated wood again from this context and rediscovered its potential for wrestling the truth out of it, which, as such, resists any smooth handling and easy appropriation by artists. Its basic tool is a *knife*—and not a brush.

The discovery of wood is important in two regards: on the one hand, it helped to reconnect the arts to a mythological German background in which forests played an important role and, on the other hand, it helped to establish the *Brücke* artists as antimodern artists, insofar as the choice of wood was posited against all modern inventions in design and architecture, such as glass, steel, and iron. In contrast to the latter materials, which are characterized by blank, transparent, clean, and cold surfaces, wood keeps its connection with nature. It has a "dark" nature and its workability is closely related to the human body—that is, hands. Accordingly, the apperception of wood in this context implies references to a different history than the contemporary materials used in architecture and design. The 1913 chronicle of the *Brücke* group was cut in wood, and it was introduced by Kirchner as a material that was not used in modern French art, which he conceived of as nonmaterial, nonbodily, and "soft." Whereas modern materials, such as glass and steel, have no surface, wood that is used in the woodcut is characterized by irregular shapes, forms, and surfaces, as well as by an unevenness that gives the woodcut a specific *physiognomy*. The woodcut, especially when seen from the perspective of the artist, is like a face and displays a rural "character" with implications to a nonindustrialized way of life. Wood carving is associated with the arts and crafts movement in Germany, and virtually no other country around that time had such extensive discussions about the identity, culture, and history of materials,[40] which led to an almost "metaphysical dimension"[41] in how German artists and intellectuals alike thought of wood as a mediation of the German people with their "land." The closeness of the

earth in the woodcut brought up associations with the role of the forest in German fairy tales and in romantic German art, especially classical music (for example, Brahms). This undoubtedly political horizon and cultural identity is also visible in the close approximation of the *Brücke* artists with geographically specific regions in Germany, such as the northern region, which is characterized by wide spaces, a wide horizon and open sky, small quaint (protestant) villages, as well as wind and water. The wide northern landscape is characterized by clarity, the absence of mountains and hills, sharp contrasts, and a wider and high sky. Heckel and Schmitt-Rottluff often spent their time on German islands in the north as well as in now famous towns at the sea, such as Dangast. Schmitt-Rottluff visited Nolde in 1906 on the tiny island of Alsen, as it can be seen in Heckel's *Alsen Landscape* (1913), for whom the sea was the landscape of his longing. According to Heckel, he found there a feeling for the high sky, the open space, the materiality of air and wind, as well as the cold, sharp, and clear atmosphere of life at the sea.[42] As Heckel puts it: "the landscape of the *Jadebusen* influenced me through its roughness and the force of its colors."[43] These landscapes are characterized by extreme light situations based on contrast and the extraordinary flatness of the landscape that stands in opposition to the German mountain regions of the south. The flatness of the ground stands in contrast to little church towers and farm houses that via their reed roofs remind one of the surrounding earth and natural world. It is as if the landscape can be found *in* the cultural products. In addition, the landscape is organized by formal patterns, such as country paths, windmills, little streams that are rhythmically structuring and enveloping the surrounding marsh land, swamps, dunes, badlands, moorland, and the geest landscape. The *Wattenmeer* in the north is based on extraordinary tidal differences, which exposes the muddy grounds of the sea for several hours every day. With Heidegger, one could say that earth and world come together here in a fascinating synthesis, so it should come of no surprise that artists who wanted to escape capitalist culture found themselves fascinated by it. This natural environment helped the *Brücke* artists to invent new cultural ideas, new forms of painting, and new ideas about the connection between art and life that are not based on factories, luxuries, or tourism.

Figure 5.1. Erich Heckel (1883-1970). *Alsen Landscape* (*Landschaft auf Alsen.* 1913. Woodcut, composition (irreg.): 10 9/16 x 11 7/16"; sheet: 14 9/16 x 20 13/16". Publisher: unpublished. Printer, the artist, Berlin. Edition: unknown (few impressions). Gift of Samuel A. Berger. *Source: © 2015 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York / VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn. Digital Image copyright The Museum of Modern Art/ Licensed by SCALA/ Art Resource, NY.*

As many commentators point out, the *Brücke* artists did not make use of professional models for their portraits,[44] which was supposed to bring out a more "natural,"—that is, nonreflective, relationship between model and artist. Wood cuts of the eleven-year-old "Fränzi," whom the *Brücke* artists used together with her thirteen-year-old sister "Marcella" for their open air portraits and nude painting,[45] are by now famous. The impulse to renew culture emerges out of the treatment of the woodcut and thereby contains a utopian element that Lukacs misses in his critique of the expressionist movement. In the words of Marcuse,

> **the possible "other" that appears in art is trans-historical inasmuch as it transcends any and every specific historical situation. [. . .] This insight, inexorably expressed in art, may well shatter faith in progress but it may also keep alive another image and another goal of praxis, namely the reconstruction**

> **of society and nature under the principle of increasing the human potential for happiness.**[46]

The extraordinary weight of the German north might surprise a non-German audience, but we should note that the southern landscape of the mountains and the flat landscape of the north are not only deeply ingrained in German everyday geographical imaginations and huge differences in linguistic expressions, but also different from what established itself as *the* mythological concept of German romanticism, namely, the forest.

The *Brücke* artist freed the woodcut from its commercialization during the nineteenth century and rediscovered it as a genuine mode of artistic mediums and practices. This also includes the usage of different types of woods. Whereas in the nineteenth century hard forms of wood were preferred, the *Brücke* artists worked with softer types of wood that were also used by German renaissance artists. Wood and image come together in a unique unity, and wood seems to be best suited for bringing out the *struggling* character of the artist is creative impulse to *wrest* the truth directly from the material without the history and cultural mediations of industrial materials, complicated painterly tools, etc. In addition, we could say with Husserl and Heidegger, that wood contains apperceptive references to *weather* and that its weather-beaten character does not get lost in the way the *Brücke* artists dealt with and developed the wood cut.

Finally, we would do well to remember that wood, even after a long time, *smells*. Though the particular smell of woodcuts goes away, for the artists, when handling the material, it was present and must have reminded them of both the open forest landscape and the smell of wood in private houses and in many German churches. As Wagner points out, the woodcut is also related to the discussion of plasticity and the German term *Bildhauerei*, which could be translated as "image carving" or "image stabbing." The latter term was the older term for "sculptor" in German and its literal sense carries with it a sense of *cutting* and *stabbing* of the material. *Bildhauerei* was posited against older traditions of sculpting as a more authentic way of forming earth like materials in a "blocky" form.[47]

THE *BRÜCKE* EXPRESSIONISM AND THE WOODCUT AS ARTISTIC EIDETIC INTUITION

As I tried to indicate in the foregoing section, as a newly discovered material wood was best suited for developing a flat style with its focus on two-dimensionality, sharp contrasts, clear colors, simplified shapes and angles, free unfolding of perspectives, and the reduction of isolated forms, all of which are characteristics of an essentialist reduction of the image to its most basic features. Moreover, the materiality of this type of image making *con-*

tains references and hidden apperceptions of the environment and "earth" out of which these images emerge. Accordingly, by rediscovering the woodcut as an artistic image practice, the *Brücke* artists not only reduced the image to certain formal qualities, but, instead, these formal qualities were at the same time *material* qualities of both the material (wood) and the environment indicated *in* the material and its treatment.[48] As Nolde aptly puts it in relation to his own work: "I want so much for my work to grow forth out of the material just as in nature the plants grow forth out of the earth."[49] Only this connection between formal *and* material features, I submit, allows us to speak of *Brücke* art as an eidetic art, insofar as it contains both elements that I introduced in the first sections of this essay, namely, (1) (formal) abstraction that is carried out and realized through (2) (material) empathy towards the genuine potentials of the woodcut as a revelation of basic and essential characteristics of people, scenes, and landscapes. Artistic variation is a *material* process. Only the combination of both elements, formal abstraction and material empathy, allows us to bring together the "emphasis on personal expression and essential form,"[50] whereby the impulse towards abstraction and the essential is paired with a *feeling-in* (*Einfühlung*) the material.

Let us look at Karl Schmidt-Rottluff's incredible *Boats on the Sea* (1913).[51] The achieved levelling of the two-dimensional plane is accomplished through the removal of perspectival features and the extreme focus on selected features that become visible through the ordering of all image elements on the same plane—that is, without any weight differences. With their edged forms the boats are perfectly integrated in the surrounding landscape and become fully immersed in it. However, due to the concentration of the black areas making up the sails of the boats, the open and transparent atmosphere of the landscape and the main features of the sea turn this image into a *seascape*. The contrast is heightened and the focus on thick lines make this a rare example of how, with minimal means and only two basic line rhythms (the edged spots of the beach vs. the rounded lines of the sky), that which this landscape *is about* becomes revealed in the image. As others have noted, the formal contrast *in* the image is echoed by the contrast in its content, such as earth and sky, or, in this case, water and sky.[52] What we have in front of us is not a re-presentation of something given; rather, the image is a presentation of something essential, i.e., what this landscape *is about*. What I have in mind is superbly expressed by Gadamer in *Truth and Method*, as he writes:

> **the situation basic to imitation that we are discussing not only implies that what is represented is there (*das Dargestellte da ist*), but also that it has come into the *There* more authentically (*eigentlicher ins Da gekommen ist*). Imitation and representation are not merely a repetition, a copy, but knowledge of the essence.**[53]

Figure 5.2. Karl Schmidt-Rottluff (1884–1976). *Boats on the Sea* (*Boote auf See*) (1913), published 1914. Woodcut, composition: 7 13/16 x 10 5/8": sheet: 13 3/4 x 17 3/4". Publisher: Verlag Der Sturm, Berlin. Printer: the artist, Berlin. Edition: special edition (unknown) printed by the artist. Gift of Abby Aldrich Rockefeller. The Museum of Modern Art. *Source: © 2015 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York / VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn. Digital Image copyright The Museum of Modern Art/ Licensed by SCALA/ Art Resource, NY.*

The contrast and reduction of certain features leads to a different treatment of color not only in the graphic color works but also in the paintings, inasmuch as color "no longer is color of things."[54] As a consequence, even *Brücke* paintings become "sketchy."[55] In the woodcut, this treatment of color comes out in a paradoxical way, namely, through its *absence* in what we perceive as "fillable" forms between the outlines. *Boats on the Sea* is an extraordinary example for why the thesis that eidetic intuition leads to "abstractions" is wrongheaded. As we can see, the abstractive features are not really abstract since they are used to work out an empathetic view of a landscape that, because it reveals itself in its essential structure, becomes a *felt* landscape. With Adorno, we can say that the wood is not treated here by the artist in a destructive manner; instead, the treatment of the material leads to its utmost potential for an empathetic relation to the land and to landscape. In addition, as we noted above, since traces of the human body and the hand—that is,

work, remain in the relief plate, the hand and the body remain visible in the result.[56]

To take another example, let us look at Heckel's *Crouching Woman* (1913).

The reduction to the extreme black and white contrast is matched by the simplification of the relation between fore- and background. The dualistic structure of the woodcut leads to the interchangeability of fore- and background and, as a consequence, to a counterpoint, if not dialectical, method.[57] This method is able to bring together, to unify, and to synthesize diverse topics, as well as extreme differences and divisions into *one* image. In this woodcut by Heckel, the leveling of the spatial relations and the expansion of the figure to the margins of the image lead to a tense presence of the woman and a focus on her mimicry. The concentration of the image is brought about by a process of despatialization that is no longer based on light and shadow as ways of focusing on motifs and controlling the viewer's gaze. Instead, we find here a concentration on form alone, without falling back onto ornamentation (elements of which we find in Matisse's work). This concentration brings out the melancholic sense of "Siddi" (Heckel's partner), which is elevated through the almost mask like eyes and the downward pressure of the upper part of her head onto the mouth and the closed lips, as well as her "crouching" position that comes out in the position of her hands touching each other. The fingers seemed to be "carved" and, as a consequence, they take on a wood-like quality; they are *holzschnittartig*. The reduction of all image elements brings out and displays *acceptance of fate*, which is countered by the round-shaped right breast. Since only the right breast is visible, and because the breast is the only nonedged element in the image, it shows even more the etched features of her face.

The development shows that whereas the *Brücke* artists began their work in wood with a focus on planes, shapes, and areas, they soon began to focus their work on the role of the *line* in woodcuts, which lead to even more emphasis on the role of unity both in contrast and with regard to opposites. It is precisely this dual structure that allows us to interpret the woodcut and graphic work around that time as the (nonintentional) attempt to translate eidetic variation into the creative process itself. The result is an immense *intensification* and *condensation* of the image process itself that leads to an overall *simplification* of the image.

Figure 5.3. Erich Heckel (1883-1970). ***Crouching Woman*** (***Hockende***) from the portfolio ***Eleven Woodcuts*** (***Elf Holzschnitte***). (1913), dated 1914 (published 1921). Woodcut, composition (irreg.): 16 3/8 x 12 3/16"; sheet (irreg.)" 24 3/16 x 19 7/8". Publisher: J. B. Neumann, Berlin. Printer: Fritz Voigt, Berlin. Edition: 40; plus a few proofs outside the edition. Gift of J. B. Neumann. ***Source: © 2015 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York / VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn. Digital Image copyright The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by SCALA/Art Resource, NY.***

As we saw above, Husserl's way of *doing* philosophy pushes aside extended conceptual reflections and chains of logical arguments, and is not based on overly technical "instruments"; instead, the eidetic intuition is a

direct and intuitive access to the truth, even if this process itself takes time, and can only come about through communication and clarification. The non-conceptual character of eidetic intuition is of central importance for our topic, since most *Brücke* works are based upon a nonintellectual approach to the creative process and hence, it allows us to speak here of *artistic intuition.* Whereas the aspect of variation and distance to reality can be seen as the abstractive impulse in wood cuts, the intuitive aspect can be translated as the empathetic aspect of the wood cut in how the formal aspect comes out in its specific materiality. Again: Husserl's eidetic intuition, at least in the old metaphysical sense of "abstraction," does not lead to an abstraction, insofar as the goal of the process is to come to an understanding of the *issue* in question and, as Adorno, even in his late writings underlines, it can even be found in in *single* phenomena. Consequently, abstraction in Husserl does not mean that we find an isolated essence *beyond* its instances; rather, abstraction is supposed to *mimetically* grasp the object. As Kracauer rightly observes, the expressionist painters take on a position that defends the particular expe-rience of what they conceive as the industrial and capitalist reduction of every experience to the same. In philosophical terms, one could say that the expressionist artists do not *simply* want to depict the particularity of a situa-tion or an experience; rather, they want to find the essential *in* the particular, which is precisely Husserl's impulse, too. As a consequence, the *typical* comes to the forefront.[58] As we saw above, the typical is the decisive term in the realm of nonexact essences for Husserl, and, in addition in Husserl's later period the typical became far more important than it was in the earlier logical works.

The typical is a prominent feature of Kirchner's *Dancer with Raised Skirt* (1910), which displays the typical features of a dancer through the elegant reduction of the image to forms and shapes. In particular, we get a sense of the movement of the skirt that is in the process of being moved from the left, expanded arm, to the right, bent arm, which is supported by the dynamic and uneven placement of the dancer that produces a dynamic between the left upper and the right lower corner of the wood cut. Accordingly, the essential can be reached in *one* exemplar and it is this feature that allows us to speak of artistic intuition here. Forms are not only extremely simplified, but also, taken out of any narrative embededness, the consequence is that they lack a past and future horizon beyond the image. This disconnectedness of a tempo-ral horizon beyond the image leads to the impression that everything is *in* the image and that everything that this image is about is to be found *in* it. Again: presentation is the mode of the woodcut, and this is supported by the removal of all elements that could be read or perceived as *signs*, insofar as signs always point beyond themselves. The absence of signitive—that is, empty intentions—in the woodcut, leads to the full presence of the image in itself,

despite its reductive features. This fact is missed by Kracauer. Woodcuts always appear "full," despite their formal "emptiness."

Whereas oil paintings can be constantly overpainted and "corrected" during their process of creative emergence, woodcuts and many other graphic forms of art cannot be corrected, which gives them a "fixed" and nonfluid appearance. This detachment leads to their abstract and "harsh" appearance. As Hoffmann points out, the harsh appearance of many *Brücke* works is not only the result of the elevated use of graphic modes and the woodcut; rather, already the drawings and sketches were produced in very fast creative processes and were not intended for corrections.[59] Accordingly, Heckel and Kirchner were able to intensify the effect of their "rawness," which, for the

Figure 5.4. Ernst Ludwig Kirchner (1880-1938). *Dancer with Raised Skirt* (*Tanzerin mit gehobenem Rock*) from the portfolio *Brücke 1910*. (1909, published 1910). Woodcut from a portfolio of two woodcuts, one drypoint and one woodcut cover. Composition (irreg.): 9 15/16 x 13 9/16" Sheet: 15 3/4 x 21 1/4". Publisher: Künstlergruppe Brücke, Dresden. Printer: the artist, Dresden. Edition: unknown (approx. 70); plus several T. P. Rica Castleman Endowment Fund, the Philip and Lynn Strauss Foundation Fund, Frances Keech Fund, and by exchange: Nina and Gordon Bunshaft Bequest, Gift of James Thrall Soby, Anonymous J. B. Neumann, and Victor S. Riesenfeld, Lillie P. Bliss Collection, and Abby Aldrich Rockefeller Fund. *Source: Digital Image copyright the Museum of Modern Art/ Licensed by SCALA/Art Resource, NY.*

viewer, translates into their *originality*. Some of these works seem to directly emerge out of the object, which, again, produces the immense presence and "urgency" of these images. Kracauer argues that in expressionist images the anatomy of the body and the structure of the body no longer play any role.[60] Given what we have discussed so far, we can safely reject his thesis. Of course, *details* of the human anatomy are no longer important, but the extremely selective nature of the woodcut leads precisely to the opposite, namely, the condensed and intense impression of, in this example, Heckel's *Siddi*. If we look at the famous wood cut *Fränzi*,[61] we encounter a body that no longer *naturalistically* imitates the human body; instead, in its extremely reductive version, some of the most basic features of Fränzi's body come to the forefront, namely, in this case, the very *thin* and flat body features in contrast to the forms of the face, particularly the focus on her mouth and eyes. This *overemphasis* of the facial features not only reminds us of the influence of non-European art at that time, but primarily of a *realist* impulse of this particular woodcut, if we understand by realism the empathetic and mimetic impulse. If we understand with Benjamin the mimetic capacity as the capacity to produce semblance, then *Fränzi* is an extraordinary example of realism. As Brecht has it, "no realist is satisfied with repeating what we already know, which would not show a lively relation to reality."[62] In recent works, Thomas Metscher has argued that we should understand realism as a necessary component of the artistic process, insofar as realism is precisely the attempt to "sublate" a simple naturalism into a position that brings out the "essential image" (*Wesensbild*). This essential image, he argues, is based on a sensual-spiritual unity of what the image presents: "realist art is presentation of the type [*Typus*]."[63] This is echoed by Schmidt-Rottluff's statement that he intended to "reveal the being and silent life of things."[64] In this vein, it becomes even less understandable why Lukacs complained about the "abstractive impoverishment of content" and "scantiness of content,"[65] which, according to him, are simply a "reflective fleeing from the reality."[66]

CODA: THE PROGRESSIVE CONTENT OF EXPRESSIONIST GRAPHIC ART (A LOOK BACK ONTO THE EXPRESSIONISM DEBATE)

The woodcut, which, unfortunately, was interpreted at its beginning as an instance of German culture, Germanic roots, and German nationalism,[67] can be understood as a projection of a world that has overcome the modern destruction of capitalism in general and, in particular, as a projection of a nondistorted relation between humans and nature from a standpoint that Adorno called the "standpoint of redemption." Only if we take this progressive nature of the *Brücke* woodcut and graphical impulse into account, can

we see the deep *social* vision that is included in their works and which speaks against Lukacs's rejection of the entire expressionist movement as a degenerated form of subjectivist avant-garde that retreats from social reality without grasping its reality.[68] Similarly, claims that in *Brücke*'s art we are confronted with a simple cultural nationalism are wrongheaded, since the *works* themselves speak against this interpretation, which is mainly pulled from the manifestos and writings at that time. For we cannot simply infer from the cultural nationalism that we find in abundance all over the Western world during the first quarter of the twentieth century, that the content of the produced art work is based on it; otherwise we would, for example, also need to claim that almost all major art works produced after World War II in the United States are imperialist works.

In order to build comprehensive accounts of expressionist art, one would also need to take into account the development of expressionist art after World War I, during which most former members of the *Brücke* group, such as Heckel and Pechstein, joined the *Novembergruppe*, positioning themselves on the side of socialist revolution, side by side with Kollwitz, Kokoschka, Dix, Grosz, and many others. Indeed, in later depictions, suffering, town experiences, and the discontent with the war are important topics for expressionist artists.[69] Accordingly, it is astonishing to see that hostile commentators interpret expressionist art as a form of subjectivism or as the attempt to "abstract" from the social reality. For example, Kracauer claims that the single most important goal of the expressionist will to art [*Kunstwollen*] is to express the ego in its purest form.[70] As we have seen, however, the situation, at least in relation to expressionist graphic art, is more complicated. Although it is correct to interpret the expressionist impulse as a move toward the ego, this move is, as in Husserl, used to reach an objective insight. Despite the Nietzschean rhetoric of the *Brücke* artists and the influence of psychologists, such as Lipps, one can observe in *Brücke* the same move that Husserl tries to make when confronted with psychologism in regard to consciousness and logic at the beginning of the twentieth century. The discovery of features of landscape, human body, and experience that we discussed in the preceding are not pure expressions of "life" or psychic expressions, as some have argued. Thus, though it is correct to understand the expressionist movement as a reaction to the capitalist and bourgeois restrictions of modern life and the attempt to deliver a romantic counterposition to some aspects of modern life, the expressionist attitude cannot be reduced to an irrational explosion of life energy or to an antirational attitude.[71] Quite the opposite is true: a unique essential level is established *through* the connection with immediate experience *in* the materiality of the image, which reveals to the viewer a world of elements, simplicity, and a condensed outlook of nature, humans, and life.

The materiality of these images is overlooked in many philosophical treatments of expressionism. Consequently, we should reject Lukacs's general attack of expressionist art as a form of decadence that expresses a bourgeois position that abstracts away from class struggle.[72] As Bloch, Brecht, Adorno and others have argued, we *do* find the vision of a better society in expressionist art, even if it is not necessarily drawn from the position of the proletariat. As Bloch points out, in times of crises, reality falls apart and an art that feels unable to display social totality from the "true" standpoint might be more "realist" than Lukacs wants to admit.[73] As Brecht aptly puts it, "reality not only is everything that is; rather, it is everything that becomes. It is a process. This process is contradictory. If one does not acknowledge its contradictory character, one does not know it at all."[74]

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NOTES

1. For the exception, see Ferdinand Fellmann, *Phänomenologie und Expressionismus* (Freiburg, GER: Alber, 1994).

2. Theodor W. Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 5, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1998), 202; also see Spielmann in Klaus Albrecht Schröder, *Expressiv. Die Künstler der Brücke. Die Sammlung Hermann Gerlinger*, exhibition catalog. Vienna: Albertina, 2007, 17.

3. Robin Reisenfeld, "Cultural Nationalism, Brücke, and the German Woodcut: The Formation of a Collective Identity," *Art History*, 20/2, June, 289–312, here 305.

4. The German word *holzschnittartig*, which means "woodcut like," is used in everyday conversations in German and it can be used for all kinds of objects and persons that are "simplistic," reductive, or structural. Even persons can possess a "woodcut like" character.

5. Kirchner quoted in Starr Figura, *German Expressionism: The Graphic Impulse*, exhibition catalog. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2011, 14.

6. Reisenfeld, *Cultural Nationalism*, 301.

7. Reinhold Heller, *Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism in Berlin and Dresden, 1905–1913*, exhibition catalog. New York: Neue Galerie, 2009, 19.

8. Figura, *German Expressionism*, 36.

9. Georg Lukacs, *Essays über den Realismus*, Werke, Band 4. Neuwied, GER: Luchterhand 1971, 120.

10. The contributions to the debate are collected in Hans-Jürgen Schmitt, *Die Expressionismusdebatte: Materialien zu einer marxistischen Realismuskonzeption*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1973; for this, see also Otto F. Best, *Theorie des Expressionismus*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004.

11. The idea that the creative process is similar to the phenomenological process is not new. Recently, Nicholas de Warren has pointed out a similar connection between Cezanne and Husserl's eidetic variation: "This technique of modulation instinctively performs a kind of eidetic variation of what Husserl identified as the 'inexact essence' of a sensible quality. Yet, whereas Husserl considered the progress of variation to be animated towards a *telos*, or finality, in Cezanne's handling of colour, variations of sensible quality are not directed towards a *telos* or identity" (Nicholas De Warren, "Flesh Made Paint," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 44/1, January, 78–104, here 100).

12. Edmund Husserl, "Letter to Hofmannsthal," trans. Sven Olof Wallenstein, *Site Magazin*, 26/27, 2.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. For this, see Christian Lotz, *From Affectivity to Subjectivity: Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology Revisited*. London: Palgrave, 2008.

16. Siegfried Kracauer, "*Über den Expressionismus (1918)*," in Siegfried Kracauer, *Werke, Frühe Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, Band 9.2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004, 7–78, here 58.

17. The first three paragraphs of this subsection are a condensed version of an extensive text presented in chapter 2 in Lotz, *From Affectivity to Subjectivity*.

18. Edmund Husserl, *Husserliana—Gesammelte Werke*, Band 9 (Dordrecht/The Hague, NL: Kluwer/Martinus Nijhoff: 1952–2014), 72.

19. Ibid., 73

20. Ibid., 68

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 69

23. Lotz, *From Affectivity to Subjectivity*.

24. I have dealt with Husserl's concept of image consciousness at some length in Christian Lotz, "Depiction and Plastic Perception: A Critique of Husserl's Theory of Picture Consciousness," *Continental Philosophy Review*, 2, 2007, 171–85, and Christian Lotz, "*Im-Bilde-sein: Husserls Phänomenologie des Bildbewusstseins*," in *Das Bild als Denkfigur. Funktionen des Bildbegriffs in der Philosophiegeschichte von Platon bis Nancy*, ed. Sabine Neuber. Munich: Fink, 2010, 167–81.

25. Wilhelm Worringer, *Abstraktion und Einfühlung*. Munich: Fink, 2007.

26. Madgalena Bushart, "Changing Times, Changing Styles: Wilhelm Worringer and the Art of his Epoch," in *Invisble Cathedrals: The Expressionist Art History of Wilhelm Worringer*, ed. Neil Donahue (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995), 69–85, here 70.

27. Lukacs, *Essays über den Realismus*, 124; for this, also see Richard Sheppard, "Georg Lukacs, Wilhelm Worringer and German Expressionism," *European Studies*, 25, 1995, 241–81.

28. Meike Hoffmann, "*Von der Anschauung zur Einfühlung—Die Position der Künstlergruppe BRÜCKE innerhalb der Naturalismus-Stil-Debatte der Zeit*," *Jahrbuch der Staatlichen Kunstsammlungen Dresden*, 32, 2005, 39–46, here 45.

29. Kracauer, *Über den Expressionismus*, 44.

30. Ibid., 45; see also Jutta Hülsewig-Johnen, "Seelenlandschaft—Zur Naturdarstellung des Expressionismus," in *Oh meine Zeit! So namenlos, so zerissen. Zur Weltsicht des Expressionismus*, exhibition catalogue, (Bielefeld: Kunsthalle Bielefeld 1985), 50–61, here 58.

31. Ibid., 47.
32. Kracauer, "*Über den Expressionismus*," 31.
33. Ibid., 31.
34. Ibid., 32.
35. Kerstin Stakemeier and Roger Behrens, "*Die Expressionismusdebatte in ihrer Zeit*," online, http://spektakel.blogsport.de/broschur/broschur-2/kerstin-stakemeier-roger-behrens-die-expressionismusdebatte-in-ihrer-zeit/. (2010)
36. Meike Hoffmann, "*Dangast—Moritzburg—Fehmarn: Die Suche nach dem Ursprünglichen in der Natur*," in *Die "Brücke": Gemälde, Zeichnungen, Aquarelle und Druckgraphik von Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, Erich Heckel, Max Pechstein, Emil Nolde und Otto Mueller aus der Sammlung des Brücke-Museums Berlin*, ed. Magdalena Moeller (Munich: Brücke-Museum 1995), 28–44, here 42.
37. Hoffmann, "*Von der Anschauung zur Einfühlung*," 40.
38. Ibid.
39. Büche in Schröder, *Expressiv. Die Künstler der Brücke*, 15; see also Magdalena Moeller, *Die Brücke: Zeichnungen, Aquarelle, Druckgraphik*, Brücke Museum Berlin, exhibition catalog. Ostfildern/Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje. Möller, 1992, 12.
40. Monika Wagner, "Wood—Primitive Material for the Creation of German Sculpture," in *New Perspectives on Brücke Expressionism*, ed. Christian Weikop (London: Ashgate 2011), 71–88, here 78.
41. Ibid., 79.
42. Janina Dahlmanns, "*Erich Heckels Dangaster Zeit*," in *100 Jahre Künstlerort Dangast*. Verlag: Oldenburg Isensee, 2007, 36; for this, also see Andreas Gabelmann, "*Verzicht leisten vor der Natur—Zur Landschaftsmalerei der 'Brücke,'*" in *Im Rhythmus des Natur: Landschaft im rheinischen Expressionismus*. Bonn: August Macke Haus, 2006, 161–76.
43. Ibid., 45 (cited); see also Brandt in Oldenburg Museum, *Hundert Jahre Brücke in Oldenburg. Expressionismus. Auftakt zur Moderne in der Natur*, exhibition catalog (Bremen, GER: Schünemann Verlag 2008), 35.
44. Hoffmann, *Dangast—Moritzburg—Fehmarn*, 33.
45. Ibid., 34.
46. Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (Boston: Beacon Press 1978), 56.
47. Wagner, *Wood—Primitive Material*, 80.
48. For the most beautiful examples of the graphic impulse in the *Brücke* movement check Schmidt-Rottluff's work around 1914, Kirchner's landscape woodcuts of dancers and bathers, Heckel's woodcuts around 1919; for this, see Schröder 2007 (plates 40–42, 47–49, 53–56, 108–12, 133–34).
49. Nolde quoted in Figura, *German Expressionism*, 14.
50. Ibid., 22.
51. An evenly beautiful example can also be found in Schmidt-Rottluff's *Hockende* (1911) as well as the beautiful and famous woodcut *Weg mit Bäumen* (1911).
52. Brandt in Oldenburg Museum, *Hundert Jahre Brücke*, 35.
53. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*. New York: Continuum, 114. I present extensive reflections on image constitution and presentation in art [*Darstellung*] in Christian Lotz, *The Art of Gerhard Richter: Hermeneutics, Images, Meaning*. London: Bloomsbury Press, 2015.
54. Jutta Hülsewig-Johnen, *Seelenlandschaft*, 55.
55. Büche in Schröder, *Expressiv. Die Künstler der Brücke*, 23.
56. This role of the hand in the creative and perceptive process can also be interpreted as a process of empathy. As Ferencz-Flatz notes, "cultural objects in general and artifacts in particular appresent others: they appear to us, in themselves, as having been made *by* and having been made *for* others, and these others are thus indicated to us in an 'empathetic apprehension'" (Christian Ferencz-Flatz, "The Empathetic Apprehension of Artifacts: A Husserlian Approach to Non-Figurative Art," *Research in Phenomenology*, 41, 2011, 358–73, here 363).
57. Moeller, *Die Brücke: Zeichnungen, Aquarelle, Druckgraphik*, 13. Also check, for example, the poster for the 1906 *Brücke* exhibition by Bleyl, or Heckel's woodcut *Nackt* (1905).

58. Kracauer, *Über den Expressionismus*, 72.
59. Hoffmann, *Dangast—Moritzburg—Fehmarn*, 35.
60. Kracauer, *Über den Expressionismus*, 32.
61. Check *Fränzi Reclining* (1910): http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?object_id=60684 (last accessed: 3/23/2015).
62. Bertolt Brecht, *Schriften 2, Teil 1: 1933–1942*, Große kommentierte Frankfurter und Berliner Ausgabe, ed. Werner Hecht u.a. (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag 1993), 423.
63. Thomas Metscher, *Kunst: Ein geschichtlicher Entwurf* (Berlin: Kulturmaschinen 2012), 101.
64. Ahrens in Oldenburg Museum, *Hundert Jahre Brücke*, 95.
65. Lukacs, *Essays über den Realismus*, 121.
66. Ibid., 123.
67. Heller, *Brücke: The Birth of Expressionism*, 35.
68. For this, also see Reisenfels, *Cultural Nationalism*, 300.
69. Moeller, *Die Brücke: Zeichnungen, Aquarelle, Druckgraphik*, 34.
70. Kracauer, *Über den Expressionismus*, 17.
71. Ibid., 71.
72. Lukacs, *Essays über den Realismus*, 109–50; 313–44.
73. Ernst Bloch, *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*, Werkausgabe, Band 4. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1985, 277.
74. Brecht, *Schriften*, 459.